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3The Wisdom of the Ordinary ...
Mevrouw de vice-Rector Magnifi cus, Zeer Gewaardeerde 
Toehoorders,
The most vivid memories of my childhood are not family 
gatherings at Christmas or skiing holidays in the mountains. 
Even the cherished trips to the cinema with my beloved grand-
father do not stand in my memory very clearly. Although I 
remember these moments fondly, they have become somewhat 
blurred, buried beneath the tonnes of data accumulated by 
my brain over the decades. Among a mass of hazy memories 
from my Polish childhood during the 1970s, one stands out 
particularly vibrantly, in full colour, and with all the details still 
in place. It is the memory of Pewex.
PEWEX stands for ‘Przedsiebiorstwo Eksportu Wewnetrznego’ 
(Internal Export Company), a chain of hard-currency shops, 
which sold otherwise unobtainable western consumer goods 
in exchange for foreign currency or special coupons issued by 
the Polish National Bank. Levi’s jeans, Colgate toothpaste, Lux 
soap, Marlboro cigarettes, Johnny Walker whisky, Donald Duck 
orange juice and Milka chocolate; they were all displayed in 
these bizarre enclaves of consumerism amid the communist 
landscape of scarcity.1
Since my parents did not have the resources to acquire the 
hard currency or special coupons required to shop at Pewex, 
I was occasionally taken there by my aunt and uncle. Their 
professional connections granted them access to both. As I 
am sure you can imagine, a trip to Pewex was a real treat! The 
thrill of being surrounded by seductive displays of consumer 
goods was, for me, enhanced by the promise of acquiring the 
cheapest article in the shop - a tiny, transparent box of orange-
fl avoured Tic-Tacs. The container was smaller than my childish 
hand and each candy no bigger than my fi ngertip, but the 
intensity of fl avour released by each and every one of them was 
unforgettable!
I rarely buy Tic-Tacks these days; tiny transparent boxes neatly 
stacked at a newspaper stand or beside the cashier in a super-
market seem much less seductive now. Yet, when I occasion-
ally do get them, primarily for the nostalgia’s sake, the candy 
transports me back in time, like the little ‘Madelaines’ featured 
in arguably the most famous passage of Marcel Proust’s novel, 
Remembrance of Things Past. The taste of the ‘Madelaines’ 
triggers a deep emotional reaction in the protagonist, evoked 
by long-forgotten childhood memories. Proust requires several 
lengthy paragraphs to describe these emotions, but captures 
the essential power of taste over memory in the following 
sentence:
‘But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the 
people are dead, after the things are broken and scattered, still, 
alone, more fragile, but with more vitality, more unsubstantial, 
more persistent, more faithful, the smell and taste of things 
remain poised a long time, like souls, ready to remind us, 
waiting and hoping for their moment, amid the ruins of all the 
rest; and bear unfaltering, in the tiny and almost impalpable 
drop of their essence, the vast structure of recollection.’2
(Take my word for it: it WAS one sentence)
Although I have not been concerned with memory per se in 
my scholarly work, I have extensively utilised food as a window 
through which to explore Japan’s past. Due to the intricate 
connections between human nourishment and comfort, food 
stands central in the life of each individual. Yet owing to its 
connection with profi t and power, food also plays a critical 
role in the social and economic organisation of societies. What 
happens to food and eating is, therefore, an important index of 
change, a privileged basis for the exploration of historical pro-
cesses. What we eat, how we produce and distribute our food, 
who prepares it and how we feel about it are never static, but 
rather in a constant state of fl ux. Thus, food and eating refl ect 
the sweeping forces of history echoed in everyday, mundane 
practices.
In my research, I have used food as a means to talk about 
social change, about colonialism, war, and cultural imperia-
 , ,
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lism. I have approached these topics from an interdisciplinary 
perspective within the East-Asian context. In my fi rst book, 
Modern Japanese Cuisine: Food, Power and National Identity3, I 
exposed the socio-political circumstances that provided persis-
tent stimulation for dietary change in Japan since the late nine-
teenth century. Perhaps the most important argument of the 
book is my claim that Japanese militarism had a homogenising 
and democratising effect on the Japanese diet, and Japanese 
colonial expansion was largely responsible for its increasingly 
multicultural character.
In my second monograph, entitled Cuisine, Colonialism and 
Cold War: Food in Twentieth Century Korea,4 I explored the 
subject of Japanese colonialism further. This time, I was not con-
cerned with the impact of colonialism on the Japanese diet, but 
rather I looked at how it affected the eating habits of the Korean 
people. The most surprising result of this study was discovering 
that the wartime system of state food management, created by 
the Japanese at the beginning of the 1940s, remained in place 
long after Korea’s liberation from Japanese colonial rule in 1945. 
This colonial legacy set the stage for decades of state control over 
diet in post-colonial Korea. It was the Korean War (1950-1953), 
which helped distance the system from any stigma associated 
with Japanese colonialism. The militarised context of the Cold 
War was crucial in fortifying colonial practices, which were 
adapted for the new purpose; the ideological struggle between 
North and South on the Korean peninsula.
The Legacy of War
In my current project, I employ food yet again as a window of 
historical inquiry. This time from the perspective of feeding 
the troops involved in the Asia-Pacifi c War (1937-1945) and 
the Korean War. By tracing channels of subsistence for the 
armed forces, this study aims to identify the relationship 
between the military and the civilian populations of the region. 
The point of departure is the premise that war is both an agent 
of destruction and a catalyst for innovation. These two, at fi rst 
seemingly contradictory, yet mutually constitutive outcomes of 
war, are particularly pronounced in the case of Japan.
Japan’s defeat in the Pacifi c War is considered an absolute tur-
ning point in the country’s modern history. 1945 brought with 
it the pacifi sm, democracy, and affl uence that characterised 
Japan to the rest of the world during the 1970s and 80s. It mar-
ked the beginning of Japan’s strong alliance with the United 
States, which determined its position in the world system for 
the remaining half of the century. Defeat also put an end to a 
decade of Japanese militarism and repression, commonly refer-
red to as kuroi tanima (‘dark valley’). While it is indisputable 
that 1945 is a turning point in the history of modern Japan, 
we should not overlook how the accomplishments of post-war 
Japan are deeply rooted in the pre-war period and in the ‘dark 
valley’ of wartime. As John Dower argues in his infl uential 
essay “The Useful War”, the militaristic era was a period of 
immense complexity and diversity that greatly infl uenced the 
nature and dynamics of post-war Japanese society.5
The structural legacies of wartime Japan to the post-surrender 
decades are particularly evident in relation to technology. The 
mobilisation for total war since the late 1930s stimulated a 
second industrial revolution in Japan, and spurred an unprece-
dented growth in human capital. For example, the labour force 
in manufacturing and construction increased from 5.8 million 
in 1930 to 9.5 million in 1944; in just one decade, between 
1935 and 1945, the number of technical schools increased 
from eleven to four hundred.6 Science students, exempt from 
conscription until the very closing stages of the Pacifi c War, 
saw a spectacular rise in their number: from less than fi fteen 
thousand in 1940 to over thirty one thousand fi ve years later.7
As economic historians have documented, Japanese wartime 
technology was diverse and sophisticated in ways that facili-
tated a swift conversion to peacetime activity. Factories that 
made machine guns converted to making sewing machines; 
optical weapons factories began producing cameras and bi-
noculars. Nikon, for example, the primary producer of optical 
munitions for the Imperial Japanese Navy, had by September 
1945 selected thirty-eight designs for post-surrender produc-
tion. Seven out of the eleven major car producers in post-war 
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Japan shifted to cars from the manufacture of aircraft, tanks 
and warships.8 As Tessa Morris-Suzuki shrewdly argues ‘the 
developments of the war years had one profoundly paradoxi-
cal consequence: the unsuccessful attempt to win the “war of 
science and technology” left Japanese institutions, human skills 
and public attitudes remarkably well prepared for the massive 
import of western technology in the years which followed the 
surrender to the Allied powers in 1945’.9
While the occupying US forces were at fi rst the primary market 
for new consumer products manufactured by the former 
wartime industries, the 1950s and 60s saw high-tech com-
modities make their way into ordinary Japanese households. 
In particular, electrical appliances for the home evolved into 
objects of mass consumption. Although very expensive by 
income standards of the time, sales were stimulated by a new 
rhetoric of ‘rationalization’ of daily life and by the symbolism 
of the newly coined concept of akarui seikatsu (‘bright life’). 
Electrical appliances were turned into symbols of good living 
and hope for a better future.10 From the mid-1950s onward, the 
term sanshu no jingi (‘the imperial regalia’), became widely used 
in reference to the most desired electrical appliances: a black 
and white television, a refrigerator and a washing machine.11 
In just fi ve years, between 1955 and 1960, the proliferation of 
washing machines in Japanese households increased from 4 to 
45 per cent. By 1963, 90 per cent of all Japanese families had 
television sets. During the 1970s people became preoccupied 
with acquiring a renewed set of talismanic possessions: a colour 
television, an air-conditioner, and a car. Cars would become 
Japan’s most profi table export commodity. However in the early 
stages, the domestic market was crucial to secure the industry’s 
growth and 1966 heralded a new era of personal car ownership 
in Japan. Owing to the development of cost-effective producti-
on processes the price of a new kei jidôsha, a small economy car, 
dropped that year to the equivalent of the average per capita 
annual income, instantly becoming a realistic aspiration for 
every Japanese family.12 The domestic car market rapidly expan-
ded in the following years due to the rising standard of living, 
while tariff barriers for imported cars were kept high. These 
circumstances spurred the global domination of the Japanese 
automobile industry. By the 1980s, Japanese car manufacturers 
were gaining a major foothold in the US and European markets, 
and by the end of the twentieth century Japan had become the 
largest car producing country in the world.13
From Techno-Nationalism to Consumption
As this short overview reveals, it was the production and con-
sumption of advanced technological commodities that were 
at the crux of Japan’s post-war economic growth. Industrial 
technology also fi gured prominently in the construction of the 
post-war Japanese identity. During the 1950s technology was 
merely a symbol, an icon of an affl uent future, which a decade 
later became a fi xed component of everyday life, and a source 
of national pride. The launch of the Shinkansen high speed 
railway at the opening of the Tokyo Olympics in 1964 marked 
the beginning of a powerful association between technology 
and the Japanese national identity, a phenomenon which 
became known as ‘Japanese techno-nationalism’.
‘Techno-Nationalism’ was a term coined by Richard Reich to 
describe America’s fear of losing control over technology vital 
to its military industry and other projects of strategic national 
importance.14 Economic analysts and political scientists have 
approached Japanese ‘techno-nationalism’ from the same 
perspective; linking the Japanese drive to achieve technologi-
cal self-suffi ciency with the need for national security.15 More 
recently, scholars more concerned with the social and cultural 
developments in post-war Japan have emphasised a different 
aspect of Japanese techno-nationalism: an identifi cation with 
high-tech commodities as being essential to ‘Japaneseness’; 
indicating a sense of new ‘national cultural identity’.16 It has 
been pointed out that commercial advertising was infl uential 
in connecting consumer technology to popular conscious-
ness. For example, in the early 1960s, at a time when Japanese 
consumer electronics had not yet achieved global prominence, 
Sony promoted its portable television with the slogan: Nippon 
no hokori ga mata hitotsu! (‘One more reason for Japan to be 
proud!’).17
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The growing universal appreciation of Japanese consumer 
technologies since the 1980s has evoked further sentiments of 
cultural nationalism, including the ‘self-Orientalising’ emphasis 
on Japanese cultural characteristics as being responsible for 
the country’s technological excellence. In particular, adaptable 
ingenuity as a long-standing, unchanging feature of Japanese 
culture was highlighted in the genre of nihonjinron, essays 
about the singular uniqueness of the Japanese, their culture and 
society.18 The image of Japan as ‘a unique case’, an exotic society 
governed by centuries-old rules and traditions still prevails, even 
in academic circles, despite the fact that the Japanese ‘miracle’ 
no longer commands global attention, and the cultural myths 
proliferated during the heyday of Japan’s global economic suc-
cess have been demystifi ed. The image of Japanese quirkiness 
is eagerly perpetuated by the mass media, for which the drama 
of exoticism constitutes a key selling point. Yet, Japan scholars 
both in and outside Japan have contributed in many ways to 
the persistent representation of Japan as an ‘exotic Other’. As my 
predecessor Chris Goto-Jones explained in his own inaugural 
lecture four years ago, it is the Orientalist legacy - our own fanta-
sies of difference - which constitute the very foundation of Japan 
Studies. It is western academe itself, prof. Goto-Jones argued, 
which has actually created the Orient (read ‘Japan’) as ‘a site of 
fantastical self-indulgence, which doesn’t really exist’.19 
I am not alone among a more critical group of Japan scholars 
who believe it is absolutely necessary to strive to distance Japan 
Studies from the Orientalist tradition by mainstreaming Japan 
within existing academic disciplines. In fact, I have prepared a 
plan on how this goal can be achieved, and intend to work on 
it until my retirement, which, according to my calculations, 
will take place in January 2034. The starting point for my plan 
and the main argument of my lecture today, is that focusing 
on mundane aspects of everyday life can offer an opportunity 
for Modern Japan Studies to become a mainstream site for 
scholarly investigation, and a source of theoretical knowledge. 
Exploring daily routines, centred on human interaction with 
material objects in Japan, can be used to counter balance the 
Eurocentric approach to material culture. This will provide 
an opportunity to cast western theory in an entirely new light, 
challenging its assumptions and preoccupations, and its claim 
to universality.20
Consumption, with its sets of practices and the associated ideo-
logy of consumerism, is irrefutably a central experience in the 
lives of people around the world. Material welfare, represented 
by the consumption of goods and services, has for the last half a 
century served to legitimise capitalism in the eyes of millions of 
ordinary people. In fact, as Alex Callinicos argues in The Revenge 
of History, the inability of Eastern European regimes to create a 
viable consumer society lies at the very root of their collapse.21
As a mature and highly complex consumer society, Japan has 
the potential to serve not merely as a test case for the existing 
theories, but to become a source of the theory itself. A recently 
published ethnography of Japanese home interiors, conduc-
ted by Inge Daniels, is a prime example of this potential. Her 
study has been recognised as an important model for analysing 
domestic space.22
Through its abundant use of material objects, Japan provides 
a rich laboratory to explore the connection between people 
and things; as well as the interactions between people that take 
place through objects. The case of ‘techno-nationalism’, which 
I described earlier, is the tip of the evidential iceberg indicating 
the importance of material forms in the construction of collec-
tive and individual identities, in Japan and beyond. As Daniel 
Miller shrewdly observed, material culture is ‘a surprisingly 
illusive component of modern culture, which, although appa-
rently highly conspicuous, has consistently managed to evade 
the focus of academic gaze, and remains the least understood 
of all central phenomena of the modern age’.23
In his inaugural lecture in Leiden earlier this year, Pieter ter 
Keurs, the newly appointed Extraordinary Professor in the fi eld 
of Anthropology of Material Culture, reminded us that the 
foundation for our distain towards material objects constitutes 
an important legacy of the Enlightenment. In his prominent 
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dictum Cogito ergo sum (I think, therefore I am) the French 
philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650) defi ned thinking as 
central to the human existence, divorcing the thinking man 
from the material world.24 Since these times material objects 
have been regarded as trivial and inconsequential to human life 
and have been largely marginalised in scientifi c and philosoph-
ical discourses.25 Even anthropology, which began with a strong 
focus on material artefacts had, by the 1920s, given preference 
to a new methodology of participant observation; material 
culture as an intellectual tool fell by the wayside.26
This disparaging attitude towards material culture began to 
change three decades ago. Studies of material objects and 
human interaction with the artefactual world have experienced 
a true renaissance, revealing how seemingly trivial and com-
mon place objects perform an active role in social and cultural 
processes. As scholars have convincingly demonstrated, the 
material world is not merely a context of our lives, but in many 
ways, and on many levels, it affects our inner selves. First of 
all, objects have an impact on our physical comfort and, by 
extension, our state of mind. It seems redundant to explain 
the distress, both physical and emotional, of an ill-fi tting 
shoe, a crowded bus, or a dysfunctional computer. Neither is 
it necessary to spell out the contrast evoked by a comforta-
ble chair, a delicious meal or a cuddly scarf in the middle of 
winter. Yet, our interaction with things is far more meaningful 
than the embodiment of their materiality alone. By affecting 
our daily routines, objects profoundly infl uence our attitudes 
and assumptions. The most obvious example of this is the 
impact of technological innovations, such as the airplane, 
the telephone and the Internet have had on our perceptions 
of time and space. Consumer goods are also actively used in 
social and individual self-creation, they are fundamental to 
our understanding of ourselves and others. Think of choices 
like following the latest fashion, or intentionally not following 
it; think of subcultures and their totemic attributes; think of 
the transformation women underwent between shedding the 
corset, in the early twentieth century, and slipping into jeans 
half a century later.
The Power of Objects
In Japan, and elsewhere, people-artefact interaction is con-
sidered of secondary importance to the processes of culture. 
Yet, upon closer examination, it appears that cultural change is 
often facilitated through commodities. A powerful example to 
illustrate this process is the transformation of ‘cuteness’ into an 
omnipresent daily aesthetics and mainstream cultural feature 
of contemporary Japan. During the last two decades, the sugar-
coated, comic-book atmosphere communicated by cuteness 
has become pervasive in Japan, colonising even such sober 
institutions as the police and Self Defence Forces.
Cute (kawaii) was originally the domain of children and 
young girls. Objects classifi ed as kawaii initially included small 
animals, cartoon characters and fl uffy toys, which evoke warm 
feelings of affection and the impulse to cuddle. It was during 
the fi rst half of the 1980s that cuteness became visible as the 
dominant characteristic of Japanese popular culture; from mu-
sic to advertising and fashion. This phenomenon is considered 
to have been brought about by two concurrent developments. 
On the one hand, the popularity of a burgeoning range of cute 
products was accompanied by the entry of unmarried women 
into consumer market. The demand for female offi ce wor-
kers in the thriving Japanese economy provided young single 
women with a disposable income and a freedom to spend it 
as they wished. On the other hand, some scholars suggest that 
young adults, seeking greater personal freedom, have adopted 
‘cute culture’ as a form of stubborn resistance towards the 
constraints of adult society.27
By the 1990s, when the women infatuated with the cute style 
of the previous decade started their own families, the range 
of kawaii objects expanded into the infl uential realm of the 
homemaker to include kitchenware, electrical appliances, 
pillow cases, bath towels, and daily necessities, such as toiletries
and food.28 Moreover, the association with the use and 
exchange of cute objects began to shift from infantilism and 
girlish femininity towards being cheerful and ‘young at heart’; 
attributes that acquired an increasingly positive connotation. 
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This was an important step in the embracing of kawaii by men 
and corporate players, such as banks and telephone companies. 
Following the example of Tokyo Metropolitan Police, which 
in 1987 created its own cute mascot Pipo (short for ‘people’s 
police’), local police corps all over Japan now boast their own 
mascots strategically deployed to soften their authoritarian 
image. In 2008, the Justice Ministry encouraged local prosecu-
tors to create their own mascots (so-called ‘soft characters’, 
yurukyara) to promote the lay-judge system to be introduced 
in Japan the following year.29
Perhaps the most extreme example of the proliferation of the 
concept of kawaii in contemporary Japanese society is the 
phenomenon described by Sabine Frühstück in her ethno-
graphy on the Self Defence Forces. She argues that through 
the extensive use of cuteness, from the 1990s onward, the Self 
Defence Forces strove to manipulate and align themselves with 
popular culture, seeking to redefi ne and actively claim their 
place in Japanese society. These strategies have, according to 
Frühstück, ‘symbolically “disarmed” the SDF; normalized and 
domesticated the military to look like other (formerly) state-
run organizations such as the railway and postal systems’.30
At the turn of the twenty-fi rst century, the successively ex-
panding infl uence of cute objects reached global dimensions. 
Widespread distribution and consumption of Japanese cute 
goods to other parts of the world - a phenomenon that Chris-
tine Yano labels ‘pink globalization’ - has profoundly changed 
the image of Japan.31 Even the Japanese government has chosen 
to capitalise on cuteness as a new, youth-oriented way to brand 
Japan, relinquishing the dark-suited businessmen at work for a 
newer, overtly playful, feminised iconography of kitsch.
The main attraction behind the globalisation of kawaii culture 
is its paradoxical empowerment.32 Kawaii has come to signify 
rebellion against the alienation of ‘civilisational perfection’, 
it promises freedom from the coldness and automation of a 
techno-future.33 Another appeal of kawaii is its surreal nature. 
Unrelated to any cultural, ethnic or national tradition it is a 
space that is both foreign and familiar, an imagined commu-
nity of fantasy that happens to be invented in Japan.
The epitome of the new global Japan is Hello Kitty, a white 
mouthless kitten, which now rivals Mickey Mouse as the most 
recognised contemporary cartoon character. Since its launch 
in 1974, Hello Kitty has grown into the best-selling asset of the 
Sanrio Corporation, which designs and manufactures a vast 
range of cute products. But the little kitten is the only one that 
has turned into a lifestyle brand, a global logo that is omni-
present and can potentially infuse the entire material world, 
from clothing, cosmetics and jewelry, to computers, mobile 
phones, cars, guns and condoms.34
Now that she colonises shopping malls all over the world, 
Hello Kitty has found a new home in museums. September 
this year saw Leiden’s Japan Museum SieboldHuis follow the 
global trend by organising an exhibition and series of activities 
dedicated to Hello Kitty. Just a few minutes’ walk from this lec-
ture hall, the museum is located in the building where, in 1832, 
the now famous ethnographic collection of Philipp Franz Von 
Siebold (1796-1866) opened to the public. A set of over 5000 
artefacts gathered by Von Siebold in Japan between 1823 and 
1829 is the largest collection of its kind in the world. It sits at 
the heart of the National Museum of Ethnology, which ranks 
as one of oldest ethnographic museums in Europe.35
Eyewitness accounts reveal that Von Siebold succeeded through 
the use of the objects he collected to replicate an image of Ja-
pan in minute detail. One visitor, in 1835, described the experi-
ence created by the exhibition in the following words:
‘I found out how lifelike one is put in a strange country, through 
such an ethnographical collection, in which nothing which does 
not belong there has been left out, when I entered the street and 
believed myself to be wandering through one of the alleys of 
Tokyo; such was my lively fantasy, moved by what I had seen.’36
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I could not wish for a better symbolic note on which to end 
this lecture. We have come full circle, from 1832 to 2011. 
Material objects have, from the very beginning, been essential 
to the process of accumulating knowledge about Japan in 
Leiden. An exhibition of Hello Kitty merchandise is as essential 
to understanding of contemporary Japan as Von Siebold’s col-
lection was at the time of its opening. A substantial difference 
between now and then is that the global circulation of Japanese 
consumer goods, including Hello Kitty and video games, has 
made Japan less exotic and more real.
Creation of meaning through the consumption of commodi-
ties in post-industrial societies is too complex to fall neatly into 
cultural stereotypes and academic categories. Herein lies the 
strength and wisdom of the everyday and the ordinary, and the 
challenges of mainstreaming of Modern Japan Studies across 
the curriculum.
Following in the Leiden tradition, I will conclude my lecture 
with some words of gratitude. This task proved a challenge, 
since I have benefi ted in one way or another from nearly 
everyone in this room. In choosing how to direct my words of 
thanks I have decided to follow the maxim ‘less is more’. To be 
honest, I have never really believed that less is indeed more, but 
this strategy will lead us safely to the reception room within 
the next few minutes.
First of all, I would like to thank the Netherlands Organisation 
of Scientifi c Research (NWO) who has supported my work for 
nearly a decade. Without NWO grants - Veni, Vidi and Aspa-
sia - not only would I not be standing here today, but, most 
probably, I would have been compelled to leave the academia 
altogether.
I would also like to thank the students and staff of the Japan 
Studies programmes, who make up my everyday working en-
vironment. I have become involved in teaching and university 
administration relatively late in my career, following lonely 
years of research. I am now convinced that building together 
an academic community - in the genuine sense of the word - is 
far more important than the long list of tasks specifi ed in our 
contracts.
And fi nally, some personal words of thanks. 
To prof. Robertson, dear Jennifer! You expressed interest in my 
work from the very moment we met, nearly twenty years ago, 
and you have never let me down. I would be nowhere without 
your friendship and encouragement, and, above all, without 
your constructive criticism.
To prof. Goto-Jones, dear Chris! One’s fi rst boss is like one’s 
fi rst love, no-one will ever compare! You have not only given 
me continuous support, but have also helped me discover a 
side of myself that I had no idea existed.
To dr. Daniels, dear Inge! You will always be my great senpai 
of course, and I have great hopes for what we can do together, 
between here and Oxford.
And fi nally, the last person I would like to mention is prof. 
Jolanta Tubielewicz (1931-2003), who I can best describe as my 
‘academic mother’. She sadly passed away eight years ago. I met 
her for the fi rst time in 1987 at the Japanese history seminar at 
Warsaw University, and later worked on my Master’s thesis un-
der her supervision. Prof. Tubielewicz was a graceful woman, a 
generous yet demanding teacher, an industrious author, and a 
dean of the Faculty of Modern Languages.
 
A spectacular role model from quarter of a century ago. We 
need them here too, now.
Ik heb gezegd.
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